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3NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises issues of some complexity concerning
the timeliness of an action brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and various other state statutes. Vicki Miller, the
sister of a mentally retarded man and administratrix of his estate,
filed a lawsuit sounding in tort against her brother’s physicians
and the medical/geriatric facility that provided her brother’s
care.  Specifically, she filed both a survival claim of negligence
and a wrongful death claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act
arguing that her brother died because his doctors administered
a combination of psychiatric drugs to the point of toxicity, and
then failed to diagnose the extent of the toxicity before it
became irreversible and terminal. The District Court granted
summary judgment, dismissing the claims as untimely.  Miller
filed a timely appeal and has assigned numerous errors.  We will
reverse.
4I.
The facts surrounding this appeal require a rather detailed
recitation.  Decedent Henry Miller  was born severely retarded.
Although he reached a chronological age of sixty-four, his
mental age remained that of a four year old child.  Despite this
severe impairment, no one was ever appointed his legal
guardian.  See District Ct. Op., at 9.  In 1988, he was placed in
a Community Living Arrangement through Jewish Educational
and Vocational Services.  While at JEVS, Dr. Philip Markowitz
provided the decedent with psychiatric treatment, including the
prescription of  psychiatric medications, primarily a combination
of Lithium and Haldol.  From June 16, 1994 though September
22, 1995, Dr. Carlos Moreno was the decedent’s  primary
physician.  During this period Moreno monitored the decedent’s
blood levels and reported abnormal Lithium levels to the
medical coordinator at the JEVS home.  Moreno did not
5prescribe any medication for the decedent.
In October 1995, the decedent was admitted to Frankford
Hospital.  While hospitalized, the attending physician repeatedly
advised Miller that her brother’s condition was caused by an
adverse reaction to the combination of medication that had been
prescribed at the JEVS home by Markowitz.  On November 27,
1995, the decedent was transferred to the Philadelphia Geriatric
Center, where Dr. Charles Bongiorno was his attending
physician.  While at PGC, the decedent’s condition deteriorated
rapidly.  He developed a continuous fever, the cause of which
was never diagnosed.  On September 9, 1997, after his condition
became unstable, the decedent  was transferred from PGC to
Temple University Hospital.  He died on September 24, 1997.
The cause of death was listed as sepsis.
On September 21, 1999, Miller commenced legal action
against the Philadelphia Geriatric Center, Bongiorno, Markowitz
6and Moreno by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons in the
Court of Common of Philadelphia County.  Her complaint was
filed on March 1, 2000.  Moreno was an employee of Greater
Philadelphia Health Action Inc., a federally funded health
center.  Because the GPHA is a grantee of the federal
Department of Health and Human Services, its employees are
considered employees of the Public Health Service, a federal
agency.  Federal jurisdiction existed, therefore, under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346.  The
matter was removed to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The United States was
subsequently properly substituted for Moreno as a party to this
litigation. On October 20, 2000 the District Court dismissed
Miller’s claims against the United States without prejudice
because she failed  to exhaust the available administrative
remedies.  The remaining claims were later remanded to state
2.Henry Miller died on September 24, 1997, and Vicky Miller
filed her suit on September 21, 1999, within the limitations
period. The United States was substituted for Dr. Carlos Moreno
for the FTCA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679 which
governs suits against federal employees acting in the scope of
their employment.  The District Court then dismissed Miller’s
case for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies on
October 20, 2000.  Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(5)(A) and (B),
whenever the United States is substituted as the defendant under
7
court.
Miller then filed an administrative claim with the United
States Department of Health and Human Service on December
12, 2000.  Not having received a decision from the Department
after waiting more than six months, Miller filed an action in the
District Court on October 24, 2001 in which she named the
United States as a defendant pursuant to the FTCA.  On
February 26, 2002, Markowitz filed an answer and cross-claim
against Moreno in the remanded state court action, and the 
state court claims were removed to the District Court and
consolidated with her newly filed federal court action.2
this section and the action is dismissed for failure to first present
the claim to the appropriate federal agency, the claim is deemed
timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) “if the claim would have been
timely had it been filed on the date the underlying civil action
was commenced and the claim is presented to the appropriate
Federal agency within 60 days after the dismissal of the civil
action.”  Id.  Miller filed her administrative claim with the
Department of Health and Human Services on December 12,
2000, within the 60 day statutory requirement.  See 28 U.S.C. §
2679(5)(B).  Therefore, after failing to get a response from the
agency, her suit against the United States, refiled on October 24,
2001, was treated as if it was filed on September 21, 1999.
8
The Government moved for summary judgment, arguing
that Miller’s claims were barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute
of limitations.  The Government alleged that the decedent
became aware of his injury and its probable cause on October
31, 1995.  This date reflects a period in which the decedent was
admitted to Frankford Hospital with possible acute
rhabdomyolyosis, a serious disease characterized by muscle
breakdown.  Miller argues that the date from which the statute
of limitations should be calculated is September 24, 1997 — the
3.After a jury trial, the District Court entered summary judgment
in favor of defendants Philadelphia Geriatric Center and
BOngiorno.  Miller did not appeal from this order and, as such,
Philadelphia Geriatric Center and Bongiorno are not parties to
this appeal.
9
date of decedent’s death.  Miller appeals from two orders of the
District Court which disposed of her claims against Appellees
Markowitz and the United States.  The first order granted
summary judgment in favor of Appellee the United States,
holding that Miller failed to present her claims against the
United States to the Department of Health and Human Services
within the two year statute of limitations period outlined in the
FTCA.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).  In the second order,  the
District Court entered judgment in favor of Appellee Markowitz
based on Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations.3  
 II.
As our late colleague Judge Max Rosenn aptly noted in
10
Hughes v. United States, 263 F.3d 272, 273 (3d Cir. 2001),
“determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in a
case is sometimes difficult, especially in cases claiming medical
malpractice.”  This is particularly so where, as here, Miller
brings both survival and wrongful death claims under the FTCA
as well as survival and wrongful death claims pursuant to
Pennsylvania law all based on the alleged medical malpractice
of the appellees.  We turn first to the FTCA claims.
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act
Under the FTCA, a claim against the United States is
barred unless it is presented to the appropriate federal agency
"within two years after such claim accrues."  28 U.S.C. §
2401(b).  The determination of when a claim accrues for the
purposes of the FTCA is a question of federal law. Tyminski v.
United States, 481 F.2d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1973). The District
Court’s factual findings regarding the date on which Miller’s
11
claims accrued will remain undisturbed unless its findings are
clearly erroneous.  Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564,
573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511; 84 L. Ed.2d 518, 528 (1985).  Our
review is plenary, however, where the District Court’s
determinations involve the application and interpretation of legal
precepts.  D&G Equip. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 764 F.2d 950,
954 (3d Cir. 1985).
The FTCA is a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity
of the United States. The Supreme Court has admonished that
the courts should carefully construe the time limitations of the
FTCA so as not to extend that limited waiver beyond that which
Congress intended. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-
18, 100 S. Ct. 352, 356-57, 62 L. Ed.2d 259 (1979).  Normally,
a tort claim accrues at the time of injury. Gonzalez v. United
States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir. 2002).  However, in Kubrick,
the Supreme Court carved out a "discovery rule" exception for
12
FTCA claims involving medical malpractice.  Kubrick, 444 U.S.
at 111. Such claims, therefore, accrue not at the time of injury,
but rather when a plaintiff knows of both the existence and the
cause of his injury.  Id. at 119-122. Importantly, however,
accrual does not await the point at which a plaintiff also knows
that the acts inflicting the injury may constitute medical
malpractice. Id. at 122.
B. FTCA Wrongful Death Claims
Before calculating the time limitations for Miller’s
federal claims, we must first address an issue she has raised
concerning the actual characterization of her claims.  In her
brief, she argues that the District Court failed to recognize that
she was bringing both survival and wrongful death claims,
presumably in her capacity as the administratrix  of her brother’s
estate.  She argues that the majority of the District Court’s
discussion of the FTCA claims focused on negligence.  See e.g.,
4.A survival action is a continuation of the personal injury action
held by the decedent at the time of his or her death and may be
brought by the personal representative of their estate.  See
Moyer v. Rubright, 651 A.2d 1139, 1140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994);
Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 526 A.2d 323, 326 (Pa. 1987).
13
District Ct. Op. at 8 (“Therefore, the cause of action against the
United States alleging the negligence of Moreno, accrued at the
latest by December 1995 . . .”). 
In determining whether a wrongful death claim is distinct
from a survival claim, we look to state law.  Miller v. United
States, 932 F.3d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[S]tate law
determines whether there is an underlying cause of action; but
federal law defines the limitations period and determines when
that cause of action accrued."); see also Chomic v. United
States, 377 F.3d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 2004).  The wrongful death
action is distinct from a survival action under Pennsylvania law.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. Section 8302.4  Pennsylvania law creates
5.A wrongful death action under Pennsylvania law does have a
distinct curiosity to it.  While technically an independent  cause
of action,  Pennsylvania wrongful death actions are, in some
sense, derivative.  While not derivative of the decedent’s
personal injury action, such causes of action have been deemed
derivative of the original tort which resulted in injury and
eventual death. Therefore, if, on the date of the decedent’s
death, the statute of limitations had run on the underlying tort,
his survivors are barred from bringing a wrongful death claim.
See Moyer v. Rubright, 651 A.2d 1139, 1142-43 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994); Baumgart v. Keene Bldg. Prod. Corp., 633 A.2d 1172,
1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Ingenito v. AC&S Inc., 633 A.2d
1172, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Anthony v. Koppers, 436 A.2d
181, 185 (Pa. 1981).  However, if the survivors can bring a
wrongful death claim, the statute of limitations begins to run on
14
an “independent” cause of action for wrongful death.  42 PA.
CONS. STAT. Section 8301.  An “independent” wrongful death
action is one which is created for the benefit of and is held by
statutorily specified survivors and is intended to compensate
them for the pecuniary loss suffered because of the decedent’s
death.  Put another way, the action remedies the loss sustained
by the survivors who are deprived of the decedent’s earnings,
companionship, etc.5  We agree that the District Court’s opinion
the date they sustain the pecuniary loss, i.e., the date of the
decedent’s death.  Moyer, 651 A.2d at 1142.
15
does appear to conflate Miller’s claims.  Miller pleaded
“negligence” - nothing more specific than that.  However, while
she has not clearly delineated her claims, she is correct in
pointing out that the federal rules of pleading require only that
a plaintiff set forth a “short and plain statement” of his claim for
relief.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).  Moreover, under the rules, “(a)ll
pleadings ... (are to) be so construed as to do substantial justice.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f).  Pleadings need not be construed most
strongly against the pleader, rather we should make a
determined effort to understand what she is attempting to set
forth.  
The complaints filed in this matter demonstrate that
Miller was indeed alleging a wrongful death claim in addition to
16
her survival action. For example, her complaint naming the
United States as a defendant alleges that the defendant’s actions
“caused the decedent to endure pain and suffering and
contributed to the cause of his untimely death.”  Plaintiff’s
complaint at 4, ¶ 20.  Further, her “Claim for Damage, Injury, or
Death” filed with the United States Department of Health and
Human Services indicates that she “seeks compensation and
damages related to the death of Henry Miller.”  App. at 69a.
The letter from counsel accompanying the filing of this form
additionally makes it clear that Miller was making a wrongful
death claim (“we are submitting this wrongful death claim . . .”).
App. at 71a.  Having determined that Miller has pleaded a
separate wrongful death action under the FTCA, we now must
determine if that claim is timely. 
As noted earlier, the accrual date for wrongful death
claims brought under the FTCA is determined under  federal
17
law.  See e.g. Miller, 932 F.3d at 303; Chomic, 377 F.3d at 611.
Where a state statute creates such an independent cause of
action, it cannot accrue for FTCA purposes until the date of
death, which gives rise to the underlying action.  Fisk v. United
States, 657 F.2d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that while
state law created the wrongful death cause of action, the accrual
question was one of federal law); see also Warrum v. United
States, 427 F.3d 1048, 1052 (2005) (re-affirming that for
purposes of the FTCA, because Indiana law creates a wrongful
death claim substantively independent of the personal injury
claim possessed by the decedent before death, the wrongful
death claim cannot accrue until the date of the decedent’s
death)).  
We now join those circuits that have concluded, albeit
under a wide variety of factual scenarios, that wrongful death
claims, for FTCA purposes, cannot accrue prior to death. See
18
e.g., Warrum, 427 F.3d at 1051; Johnston v. United States, 85
F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1996); Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d
1436 (9th Cir., 1985); Fisk, 657 F.3d at 167.  Here, Henry Miller
died on September 24, 1997, and his sister filed her wrongful
death action against the United States on September 21, 1999.
Because Miller brought her wrongful death action within two
years of the decedent’s death, her claims are timely.
C. FTCA Survivor Claims
Miller further claims that the District Court erred by
holding her survival claims against the United States and
Markowitz to be time barred. These claims were also brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 
The same two dates are once again at issue here: October
31, 1995 – the date when the doctors at the Franklin Hospital
informed Miller of the cause of her brother’s health problems,
19
and September 24, 1997, the date of his death. Miller again
argues that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of
her brother’s death.  The Government asserts that the claims
accrued when Miller knew of both the existence and the cause of
Henry’s injury, October 31, 1995.  Relying on this date would
render Miller’s claims time-barred.  If the date of accrual is the
date of the decedent’s death, however, Miller’s claims are timely.
The District Court concluded that October 31, 1995 was the date
the claims accrued because it was on this date that Miller knew
both the cause and existence of her brother’s illness.  Miller
argues that the District Court erred by looking to her rather than
to the decedent as the proper person to whom the reasonable
person standard of the FTCA discovery rule applies.  We agree.
The record is quite clear that, although Miller closely
monitored her brother’s health and treatment, she was not his
legal guardian.  Even though she was not his legal guardian, the
20
District Court nonetheless looked to Miller to determine when
any lawsuit should have been filed.  This was error.  Miller
would not have had the authority to file a suit on the decedent’s
behalf while he was alive unless she was appointed his guardian.
Hence, the District Court’s discussion of what Miller knew or
what a reasonable person with Miller’s knowledge should have
known is irrelevant to a determination of when the statute of
limitations ran.  
We are left to look at what the decedent Henry Miller
knew or what a reasonable person with the decedent’s knowledge
should have known.  But this is problematic.  As noted earlier,
the decedent was mentally impaired, with the approximate mental
age of a four year old child.  In deciding not to look to Henry’s
knowledge, the District Court recognized the difficulty presented:
Admittedly, for purposes of determining the date
upon which the statute of limitations commences
in a survival action, one inquiry is when the
21
decedent became aware of his injury and its cause.
Although it is unclear what decedent was
specifically told about his injury and it is clear that
someone suffering from mental retardation to the
extent that he was would be unable to comprehend
whatever he was told about his injury and its cause
. . .
District Ct. Op. at 8 (citing Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987
(3rd Cir. 1988)).    
On first blush it would seem that, as Kubrick instructs, we
should apply the objective reasonable person standard to Henry
Miller to determine when he should have known of his injury.
See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 111, 100 S.Ct. at 360.   In Kubrick, the
Supreme Court made no exception to the discovery rule for
persons suffering from a mental illness and so it would seem that
it should control here.  However, Kubrick is not absolute in its
application.  A consistent but narrow exception to the Kubrick
rule has been carved out by a number of courts of appeal for
situations in which the plaintiff has no culpability in failing to
22
bring a timely claim.  See Clifford by Clifford v. United States, 738
F.2d 977 (8th Cir, 1984); Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436
(9th Cir. 1985).  After all, the Court in Kubrick was clearly
concerned with the plaintiff who “armed with the facts about the
harm done to him, can protect himself by seeking advice in the
medical and legal community.”  Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123, 100
S.Ct. at 360.  The objective standard the Court adopted sought to
enforce this maxim.
In Barren, over a vigorous dissent, we applied the Kubrick
objective standard, refusing to carve out any exception for a
plaintiff whose ability to perceive that the government injured
him was destroyed by the government’s own actions.  The
plaintiff in Barren was initially competent, although he suffered
from serious mental illness, but he was rendered completely
incompetent through the government’s malfeasance in attempting
to treat his mental conditions.  In applying the Kubrick objective
23
standard to the plaintiff, we noted that allowing persons with
mental illnesses to file suit later than the objectively reasonable
person would be “tantamount to ruling that a plaintiff’s mental
infirmity can extend the statute of limitations,” and that “[s]uch
extensions have been uniformly rejected by this and other courts
of appeals.”  Barren, 839 F.2d at 992.  We also refused to
consider the effect of a delay in the appointment of a guardian,
stating that “[t]here is no reason why such a delay in the
appointment of a guardian should work to the detriment of the
Government.”  Id. at 991 n.7.  
Our reluctance in Barren to allow the plaintiff an
exception to the Kubrick objective standard stemmed from the
concern that plaintiffs who were injured by the government could
then attempt to take advantage of the “exception” by arguing
about when they became incompetent.   In other words, the court
did not want disputes over when a plaintiff became incompetent
24
to overtake or subsume the objective reasonable person standard
in Kubrick - especially when the Government was the cause of
the injury that led to the incompetency.  Barren, 839 F.2d at 991.
Additionally, we refused to address the effect of a lack of a
guardian for fear that “[a] deliberate delay” in appointing one
might also encourage extending the statute of limitations to the
government’s detriment.
However, on its facts, Barren addresses only the specific
class of plaintiffs who were not only injured by the government,
but were also prevented from recognizing their injuries by the
government’s malfeasance and we do not find its logic
controlling here.  Miller’s incapacity was not caused by the
Government’s malfeasance.  Instead, he was born totally
incompetent and remained so his entire life.  Consequently, the
concerns suggested in Barren are simply not implicated here.
The Government did not cause Miller’s retardation, although
25
they did injure him.  Thus, because Miller’s mental retardation
predated the government’s negligence, there can be no concern
that finding Kubrick inapplicable here will encourage disputes
over when a plaintiff was rendered incompetent.  Nor might it
facilitate the intentional delay in appointing a guardian because,
again, plaintiffs in Miller’s position are incompetent before the
government’s negligence occurs.  
To reiterate, we are not dealing with a person who, like in
Barren, was mentally ill but competent and then, because of the
government’s malpractice, progressed into total mental
incapacity.  Henry Miller, from his birth to his death, possessed
the intellectual ability of a four year old.  His profound disability
predating the government’s malfeasance places him outside the
purview of Barren and into somewhat uncharted waters.
Analogous to Henry Miller’s position, and instructive for the
resolution  of this case, we believe that his position most closely
26
resembles a plaintiff who is a legal minor.
For minors, it is of course true that in most situations the
Kubrick objective standard unequivocally applies.  See Crawford
v. United States, 796 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1986).  But, minors are not
subject to the Kubrick objective standard because they are
thought to be capable of recognizing their injury and thus should
be held responsible for investigating its cause, which is the
justification that underlies Kubrick.  Rather, minors are subject
to Kubrick’s standard because we look to their parent or legal
guardian.  That is, we impute to their parents or guardian the
knowledge of their injury.  We do this precisely because a legal
minor is not in a position to either understand her injuries or even
to bring a claim if she wanted to.  It follows that, in the rare
instance where a minor did not have either a parent or a guardian,
the Kubrick standard should not be applied to them because there
would be no one to whom we could impute knowledge and, also
27
because the minor herself could not have understood, let alone
brought, the claim.  Here, we are essentially dealing with a minor
— an individual who is so severely mentally incapacitated that
his intelligence equates to that of a four-year-old child.
Moreover, this “minor” lacked an appropriate legal guardian.
Accordingly, we will not apply the Kubrick objective standard to
this plaintiff.  
Having determined that Kubrick’s standard does not
apply, we now turn to a determination of when the claims
accrued.  We find instructive a class of cases — the coma cases
— identified by Judge Becker in his dissenting opinion in
Barren.  For example, in Clifford v. United States, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the statute of limitations
accrued when Clifford’s father was appointed his guardian and
not, as the government had argued, when Clifford fell into a
coma.  Clifford, 738 F.2d 977.  Specifically, the court held that
28
because Clifford had reached the age of majority, and had not yet
had a guardian appointed on his behalf, the knowledge of his
family members could not be imputed to the plaintiff himself.
See Barren, 839 F.2d at 997 (citing Clifford, 738 F.2d at 980).
Also citing Clifford, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in Washington v. United States, held that a cause of
action accrued on the date when a comatose patient died, not on
the date she entered into a fourteen-year coma. Washington, 769
F.2d at 1439.  The court reasoned that because the plaintiff was
never aware of her injury or its cause, the statute of limitations
began to run on the date of her death.  Id. at 1438.  Further, the
court found the knowledge of the plaintiff’s husband irrelevant
to her ability to file suit.  Id.
Henry Miller presents a legal situation akin to those
plaintiffs in Clifford and Washington.  Not only was no guardian
ever appointed for him, his profound mental retardation
29
prevented him from any awareness of his injury or its cause. The
objective reasonable person inquiry annunciated by the Supreme
Court in Kubrick does not apply here. Assuredly, had Vicki
Miller been appointed legal guardian for her brother at some time
before the  government’s alleged malpractice,  Kubrick would
most likely apply.  Admittedly, Henry Miller’s legal position is
a unique one, and our holding in this appeal is narrow as a result.
However, we are certainly not alone among those courts which
have carved a narrow equitable exception to Kubrick’s
reasonable person standard for mentally incapacitated persons
who, for whatever reason, do not have a legally appointed
guardian to act in their stead.  See Clifford, 738 F.2d at 977;
Washington, 769 F.2d at 1439; Zeidler v. United States, 601 F.2d
527 (10th Cir. 1979).   We will therefore reverse the grant of
summary judgment on Miller’s FTCA survival claims.
III.
30
Miller also brings survival and wrongful death claims
under Pennsylvania law.  She again asserts that the statute of
limitations for the state law survival claim against Dr. Markowitz
did not begin to run until the decedent’s death.  She also asserts
that there were genuine issues as to when the statute of
limitations began to run.  We agree that there are genuine issues
of material fact as to when Miller’s state law survival claims
against Markowitz accrued. 
Under the Pennsylvania discovery rule, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the complaining party “knows, or
reasonably should know (1) that he has been injured, and (2) that
his injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.”  Bohus
v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir. 1991).  A plaintiff need not
know the exact medical cause of the injury, that his injury is due
to another’s negligent conduct or that he has a cause of action.
Id. at 925.  The “polestar” of the discovery rule is not the
31
plaintiff’s actual knowledge, but rather “whether the knowledge
was known, or through the exercise of diligence, knowable to
[the] plaintiff.”  Id. (citing O’Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 669 F.2d
704, 711 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399
F.3d 536, 545 (3d Cir. 2005) (reiterating that plaintiffs must
exercise reasonable diligence to invoke the “safe harbor” of the
discovery rule).
Consequently, Pennsylvania’s discovery rule  is objective.
Statutes of limitations are generally strictly construed because
their exclusive purpose is to expedite litigation and discourage
stale claims so the defendant will not be prejudiced by having to
locate evidence and witnesses to defend a long-passed wrong.
Gustine Uniontown Assocs. v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., 842
A.2d 334, 346 (Pa. 2004).   Because the discovery rule tolls the
otherwise strict application of the statute of limitations, diligence
is evaluated under the reasonable person standard.  It matters not
32
what the particular plaintiff actually knew, but what he
reasonably should have known.  Until recently, no adjustments
to this objective analysis were made for mental illness.  See Lake
v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Walker v.
Mummert, 146 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1958); Pearce v. Salvation
Army, 674 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).  However,
under a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision,  “[w]hile
reasonable diligence is an objective test, it is sufficiently flexible
to take into account the differences between persons and their
capacity to meet certain situations and the circumstances
confronting them at the time in question.”  Fine v. Checcio, 870
A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005) (citing Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745
A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (internal citations omitted)).
“Under this test, a party’s actions are evaluated to determine
whether he exhibited ‘those qualities of attention, knowledge,
intelligence and judgment which society requires of its members
33
for the protection of their own interest and the interest of
others.’” Id. 
Whether a damaged party, exercising reasonable
diligence, could ascertain that he has been injured, and by what
cause, is a factual determination.  As discussed earlier, the
decedent’s knowledge is relevant for the survival claim because
it is his claim that survives his death brought by his personal
representative due to his decease.  Carroll v. Avallone, 869 A.2d
522, 528 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (citing Kiser v. Schulte, 538 A.2d
219 (Pa. 1994).  We believe that because the decedent had the
mental age of a four-year-old, this is a “difference between
persons” that must be taken into account under Fine v. Checcio,
870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005), to determine whether the decedent
knew, or, more accurately, was even capable of knowing, that he
was injured and the cause of his injury.  Because this presents a
genuine issue of a material fact, we will reverse the grant of
34
summary judgment on Miller’s state law survival claim.
Miller also asserts that the District Court erred by failing
to recognize the state law wrongful death component of her
claims.  We agree.  Generally, the right of action for wrongful
death shall exist only for the benefit of the spouse, children, or
parents of the deceased.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301(b).
However, a wrongful death action may also be brought by the
personal representative of a decedent to recover damages for
reasonable hospital, nursing, medical, funeral expenses and
expenses of administration necessitated by reason of injuries
causing death.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301(d).  Hence,
Miller, as administratrix of her brother’s estate, is a proper party
to bring this claim.  Carroll v. Avellone, 869 A.2d 522, 528 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Opperman, 780 A.2d
714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
The decedent’s wrongful death actions accrued on
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September 24, 1997, the date of his death.  See Gallick v. United
States, 542 F. Supp. 188, 191 (1982).  It is undisputed that the
statute of limitations is two years for wrongful death actions.  42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(2).  Therefore, Miller’s wrongful
death claims filed on September 21, 1999 were timely.
Accordingly, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment on
Miller’s wrongful death claims. 
IV.
The Judgment of the District Court is reversed and this
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that
Vicki Miller’s survival action against the United States pursuant
to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is not time-barred.  In my
view, we are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), and this Court’s decision
in Barren by Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.
1988), to apply an objective test in determining when the statute
of limitations began to run on Miller’s survival claim under the
FTCA.  Because Barren applied the objective test and refused to
toll the statute even though the government’s negligence
aggravated the plaintiff’s mental illness to such an extent that he
was unable to perceive that he had been injured, there is no basis
to create an exception which would allow tolling here where
Henry Miller’s inability to recognize the fact that he had been
injured was not attributable to the government’s conduct.  
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The majority ignores Kubrick’s admonition that the
FTCA’s statute of limitations must be narrowly construed in
order to avoid “extend[ing] the waiver [of sovereign immunity]
beyond that which Congress intended.”  444 U.S. at 118.
Furthermore, the majority misreads Barren en route to creating
an exception to Kubrick’s objective test which allows tolling for
a mentally incapacitated adult if the record fails to establish that
he has an appointed guardian.  The lack of an appointed guardian
is not an exception to Kubrick’s objective test, and I have found
no case law that would support creating such an exception.  For
that reason, I write separately to explain why the objective
reasonable person standard applied in Kubrick and Barren is
controlling and compels the conclusion that the District Court
correctly dismissed Miller’s FTCA survival claim as time-barred.
I also disagree, for the reasons explained below, with the
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majority’s determination that the District Court improperly
dismissed Vicki Miller’s state law survival action against Dr.
Markowitz, and that it conflated her wrongful death claims with
her survival actions.
I.
The facts set forth by the majority are not in dispute.  The
decedent, Henry Miller, was born severely retarded in 1933 and
attained the mental age of a four year old.  In his mid-fifties,
Henry was placed in a community living arrangement and his
sister, Vicki Miller, regularly visited him.  Due to a toxic Lithium
level, Henry became seriously ill in 1995.  His sister was
“repeatedly advised that her brother’s condition was caused by
an adverse reaction to the combination of medication that had
been prescribed . . . .”  Maj. op. at 5.  Despite treatment, Henry
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did not recover, and he died on September 24, 1997.
Vicki Miller filed suit on September 21, 1999.  Pursuant
to the FTCA, Miller asserted a survival action against the United
States.  The question is: when did Miller’s survival action accrue
- in October of 1995 when she learned of the cause of her
brother’s injury - or in September of 1997 when he died?  
The majority determines that the survival claim accrued
when Henry died in September of 1997.  I disagree.  My analysis
leads me to conclude that Vicki Miller’s survival claim accrued
when Henry was hospitalized in 1995 and she was repeatedly
informed that his illness was caused by a reaction to his
medication.  In my view, the majority disregards the Supreme




In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), the
Supreme Court determined that an FTCA claim accrues when the
plaintiff knows both the existence of his injury and who has
caused the injury.  Id. at 123.  Kubrick established the general
rule - which the majority acknowledges - that the inquiry is an
objective one requiring a determination of whether a reasonable
person should have known of the injury and who caused it.  See
Barren by Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir.
1988) (discussing Supreme Court’s analysis in Kubrick).
In Barren, the plaintiff, a veteran, suffered a service-
related mental disability.  839 F.2d at 987.  Although he sought
treatment from the Veterans Administration (VA) in 1973, he
was advised that his mental infirmity was not service-related and
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he was denied admission for in-patient treatment.  Recognizing
that Barren needed treatment, his sister, Henrietta, and his family
sought alternate treatment in several private facilities in 1974.  In
October of 1977, the VA reversed its prior determination that
Barren’s mental condition was not service-related and awarded
him a partial disability, subsequently increasing his disability to
100 percent.  In September of 1979, Henrietta filed two FTCA
claims, one on behalf of her brother and the other in her own
right, seeking reimbursement for medical expenses she incurred
on her brother’s behalf.  She alleged that the VA had negligently
failed to admit her brother for in-patient treatment and that its
psychiatric treatment was substandard.  Henrietta was not
appointed her brother’s guardian, however, until June of 1981.
The District Court dismissed Henrietta’s claim as
untimely.  Barren’s FTCA claim, the District Court ruled, was
42
viable because his diminished mental capacity, caused by the
VA’s negligence, had prevented him from appreciating the fact
that he had been injured.  After conducting a bench trial, the
District Court found that the VA was negligent and awarded
damages to Barren.
The United States appealed.  It did not dispute that its
negligence had caused Barren’s inability to perceive his injury.
Rather, the VA asserted that Barren’s claim was time-barred and
that the District Court erred by considering Barren’s mental
infirmity instead of applying Kubrick’s objective standard.  The
Barren majority viewed Barren’s sister, even though she was not
a guardian at the relevant time, as an objectively reasonable
person.  839 F.2d at 991.  It concluded that, in light of the fact
that Henrietta and Barren’s family sought alternate treatment for
Barren in 1974, a reasonable person should have known at that
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time that the VA’s care was inadequate and that Barren had been
harmed by the VA’s refusal to admit him for treatment. The
question was whether Barren’s mental infirmity was a factor in
the determination of when his claim accrued.
The Barren panel agreed that Kubrick’s objective test
generally controls the determination of when a FTCA claim
accrues.  The panel also agreed that an individual’s mental
infirmity is not a factor that may be considered under Kubrick’s
objective test.  839 F.2d at 995 (Becker, J., dissenting) (noting
agreement with the majority that the “general rule” is that
Kubrick’s objective test governs the determination of when a
statute of limitations begins to run and that tolling is not
permitted “by reason of infancy or mental disability”).  Even
though dissenting, Judge Becker vigorously argued for a narrow
exception in which the statute of limitations is tolled for “a
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plaintiff whose ability to perceive that the government injured
him was destroyed by the government’s negligent care until the
plaintiff is affirmatively informed of the injury in a way he can
understand, or until a guardian is appointed.”  Id.
As support for this narrow exception, Judge Becker relied
on two cases presenting FTCA claims on behalf of adults who
suffered from a coma induced by the government’s negligence,
and who, because of their mental incapacity, were unable to
recognize that they had been injured.  Id. at 997 (discussing
Clifford by Clifford v. United States, 738 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.
1984), and Washington v. United States, 769 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir.
1985)).  As a result of the plaintiffs’ inability to detect that they
were injured, the FTCA claims in these two coma cases were
filed beyond the two year limitations period.  Although the
government argued that the claims were time-barred, in each case
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the Court determined that the claim did not accrue until either a
guardian was appointed, Clifford, 738 F.2d at 980, or the plaintiff
died, Washington, 769 F.2d at 1439.  The Clifford Court pointed
out that it was presented with more than just a plaintiff suffering
from a mental infirmity.  738 F.2d at 979-980.  Rather, the
government’s conduct caused both the mental infirmity and the
inability to perceive that he had sustained an injury.  This
extraordinary situation warranted tolling the statute of limitations
because tolling prevented the government from profiting from its
own wrong.  Clifford, 738 F.2d at 980; Washington, 769 F.2d at
1439 (following Clifford).  Consistent with this analysis, Judge
Becker stressed that he advocated for the exception “not because
of Barren’s mental incompetency simpliciter, but because of the
government’s conceded participation in Barren’s inability to
perceive his injury.”  Id. at 1000.
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Although the Barren majority found that Barren’s injury,
and the reason for his inability to recognize the same, were a
“compelling reason to excuse” Barren’s untimely claim, it
concluded that “Kubrick makes clear[] the rule cannot be
subjectively applied.”  839 F.3d at 992; 994 (Sloviter, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that “fairness requires that we relax
the rule,” but that “is an issue for Congress”).  To allow Barren
to file later than an objectively reasonable person, we explained,
“would be tantamount to ruling that a plaintiff’s mental infirmity
can extend the statute of limitations.”  Id. at 992, 994 (Sloviter,
J., concurring) (finding that inclusion of plaintiff’s mental
disability “interposes an impermissible subjective element into
the reasonable person standard”).  Mindful that “limitations
periods must be strictly construed, especially those involving a
waiver of sovereign immunity,” the Barren  majority refused to
embrace the exception urged by the dissent.  Id.  As a result,
6.It is true that the nature of Henry’s mental incapacity is
distinguishable to a degree from that suffered by Barren and
that, as the majority notes, “Henry’s position most closely
resembles a plaintiff who is a legal minor.”  Maj. op. at 26. This
difference, however, is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal.
Infancy does not toll the statute, and Henry’s similarity to that
of a minor requires application of  the objective reasonable
person test.  Barren, 839 F.2d at 995 (Becker, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the majority that the two year limitations period
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irrespective of the fact that the government’s negligence caused
Barren’s inability to perceive that he had been injured,  Barren’s
case was viewed and resolved on the basis that it involved a
mental infirmity, nothing more.  Because Barren’s FTCA claim
was filed after the two year limitations period, the majority
determined it was time-barred.
B.
In my view, Barren governs this case.  The facts are
nearly identical.6  In Barren, the FTCA action was filed on behalf
for FTCA claims is not tolled by reason of one’s infancy).  
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of an adult who suffered from a mental disability such that it
prevented him from recognizing that he had been injured at the
hands of the government.  Although Barren’s mental infirmity
was substantial, he lacked a legal guardian at the time he was
negligently treated.   His sister, however, was aware of the facts
regarding his condition, his unsuccessful attempts to obtain
treatment from the VA, and that, as a result of the VA’s refusal
to treat him, she and her family had to obtain treatment for her
brother elsewhere.  These facts, the Barren majority concluded,
were sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable person should
have known in 1974 that Barren was injured by the VA’s
substandard care.
Similarly, in this case, we are presented with an FTCA
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claim filed on behalf of an adult, Henry Miller, who suffered
from a mental disability that prevented him from recognizing that
he had been injured as a result of the government’s conduct.  As
in  Barren, the disabled party’s sister, here Vicki Miller, was not
his guardian at the time he suffered an injury as a result of the
government’s negligence.  Nor was she his guardian before this
FTCA suit was filed, a fact that also parallels Barren.  Vicki
Miller, who regularly visited her brother, was aware of her
brother’s longstanding mental incapacity, his sudden physical
illness requiring hospitalization, the cause of his illness, and the
course of his medical treatment.   
Because the facts in this case are nearly identical to those
in Barren, I cannot  accede to the majority’s view that Barren is
not controlling because it “addresses only the specific class of
plaintiffs who were not only injured by the government, but were
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also prevented from recognizing their injuries by the
government’s malfeasance . . . .”  Maj. op. at  24-25.  Barren,
contrary to the majority’s reading, treated this very class of
plaintiffs in the same fashion as any other plaintiff suffering from
a mental infirmity which precluded that person from recognizing
that he had been injured at the hands of the government.  See
Barren, 839 F.2d at 996 (Becker, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
that the Barren majority’s decision “ignores the added special
factor of the government’s participation in Barren’s inability to
comprehend his injury and its cause”).  Indeed, Barren explicitly
rejected the argument that the government’s connection with the
plaintiff’s inability to perceive his injury warranted an exception
to the application of Kubrick’s objective test.  In short, the
“difference” between Barren and the instant case is that in the
former, the circumstances favoring an exception to Kubrick were
more compelling than those before us.  Still, this Court in Barren
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declared that Kubrick’s objective reasonable person test governed
the timeliness of Barren’s FTCA claim regardless of the nature
or cause of the plaintiff’s mental incapacity.
Thus, in my view, the District Court correctly applied
Kubrick’s objective test, as we did in Barren, without regard to
the nature or cause of Henry Miller’s mental incapacity.  Because
a reasonable person, like Vicki Miller, was aware of Henry’s
condition, his sudden illness and the cause of his demise more
than two years before the filing of this suit in 1999, Miller’s
FTCA survival action should be time-barred.   
The majority further misapplies Barren by reasoning that
Vicki Miller’s knowledge was “irrelevant to a determination of
when the statute of limitations ran” because she was not his
guardian.  Maj. op. at 20.   The Court in Barren instructed that,
7.Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 283 comment c  (1965)
(stating that the “reasonable man is a fictitious person”); and
comment d (explaining that the “qualities of a reasonable man
which are of importance differ with the various situations . . .
[and] are those which are necessary for the perception of the
circumstances existing at the time of his act or omission)
(emphasis added).  
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in deciding when the limitations period begins to run, the critical
inquiry is what an objectively reasonable person should have
known.  839 F.2d at 991.  To that end, we viewed Barren’s sister,
Henrietta, as an objectively reasonable person, not because she
had been appointed Barren’s guardian years after the negligence
occurred, but because she was familiar with the circumstances
surrounding her brother’s treatment over the years.7  839 F.2d at
991, and at 994 (Sloviter, J., concurring) (applying the reasonable
person standard and noting that the only distinction between
plaintiff and his sister was his mental incapacity).  In fact, in
viewing Barren’s sister as an objectively reasonable person, we
attached little, if any significance, to the fact that she was
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appointed Barren’s guardian.  We acknowledged that a
guardian’s knowledge may be imputed to the incapacitated
person, 839 F.2d at 991 n.7, but we rejected the argument that the
lack of a guardian “could allow an incompetent plaintiff to
circumvent the statute of limitations.”  Id.  Thus, Barren taught
that guardianship status is not determinative of whether the
knowledge a person possesses is on a par with that of the
objectively reasonable person.  Restatement (Second) of Torts §
283 comment c (1965).  For that reason, I cannot agree with the
majority that the District Court erred by viewing Vicki Miller as
an objectively reasonable person for purposes of ascertaining
when Miller’s FTCA survival action accrued.
The majority, however, finds the fact that Henry lacked a
guardian to be of critical importance.  It reasons that Henry’s
situation is like that of the plaintiffs in the two coma cases
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identified by Judge Becker in his dissent in Barren, 839 F.3d at
997 (discussing Clifford, 738 F.2d at 979-80, and Washington,
769 F.2d at 1436).  Because the statute of limitations was tolled
for those plaintiffs, who like Henry suffered from a mental
disability and lacked guardians, the majority concludes that the
statute should also be tolled for Henry.
In my view, these two coma cases are distinguishable in
several important respects.  In Clifford and Washington, as in
Barren, the determination of when the FTCA claims accrued
involved more than just a consideration of the plaintiffs’ mental
infirmity.  Clifford, 738 F.2d at 980; Washington, 769 F.2d at
1439; see also Barren, 839 F.2d at 996 (Becker, J., dissenting)
(explaining that this case involved more than a mere mental
incapacity).  In these cases, there was a mental infirmity caused
by the government plus the fact that the mental infirmity caused
8.The majority does not explicitly state when Miller’s FTCA
survival claim accrued.  Inasmuch as the majority explains that
the coma cases are instructive and that “Henry Miller presents
a legal situation akin to those plaintiffs in Clifford and
Washington,” maj. op. at 29, and because the record does not
indicate that Henry had a guardian, I must assume that the
majority determines that Miller’s claim accrued on Henry’s date
of death.
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by the government’s negligence prevented the plaintiff from
appreciating that he had been injured and by whom.  In light of
these circumstances and the fact that these formerly competent
adults had no one to represent their interests, the Courts of
Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits concluded that their
FTCA claims did not accrue until either a guardian was
appointed or the plaintiff died.8  See Barren, 839 F.2d at 997
(discussing Clifford, 738 F.2d at 979-80, and Washington, 769
F.2d at 1438).  Under those extraordinary circumstances, tolling
was appropriate, as the Clifford Court explained, to prevent the
government from profiting from its own wrong.  738 F.3d at 980.
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 Indeed, the Clifford Court pointed out that its holding was
limited to the “rare situation where the alleged malpractice itself
(and not some preexisting mental condition unconnected with the
government) has prevented the claimant from ever obtaining that
knowledge.”  Id.   Thus, tolling was not warranted simply
because these mentally incapacitated adults had no guardian.  
Unlike the plaintiffs in Clifford and Washington, Henry
Miller was not competent at any point in time before the
government’s conduct caused his Lithium to reach a toxic level.
Henry was born severely retarded and attained the mental age of
a four year old.   As a result, the government’s negligent conduct
neither caused nor aggravated Henry’s mental infirmity and
Henry’s inability to recognize his injury was not attributable to
the government’s conduct.  Thus, application of Kubrick’s
objective test here would not allow the government to profit from
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its own wrong.   In short, we are not confronted with the
extraordinary circumstances present in Clifford and Washington,
where the government’s conduct is the reason that the plaintiff
was unable to perceive his injury and timely initiate suit.  For that
reason, I do not believe that these two cases support creating an
exception in the case sub judice to the FTCA’s statute of
limitations, which would allow tolling simply on the basis that
this record fails to establish that Henry had a guardian in the
latter years of his life.
Indeed, in Barren, we explicitly rejected the concept that
the lack of a guardian for a mentally infirm adult plaintiff could
toll the statute of limitations.  We observed that “[a] deliberate
delay in the appointment of a guardian, under plaintiff’s view of
the statute of limitations, could allow an incompetent plaintiff to
circumvent the statute of limitations.”  839 F.2d at 991 n.7.  We
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declared that “[t]here is no reason why such a delay in the
appointment of a guardian should work to the detriment of the
government.”  Id.  My research has failed to unearth any case law
holding that the absence of a guardian, without more, warrants
tolling the FTCA’s statute of limitations for a mentally
incapacitated plaintiff.  
In my view, this novel exception created by the majority
in the absence of truly extraordinary circumstances like those in
the coma cases not only lacks any legal support, it erodes the
well-settled rule that the FTCA’s two year limitations period is
not tolled by reason of mental incapacity.   As a result, this
exception fails to heed the Supreme Court’s admonition that the
FTCA’s limitations period must be carefully construed to avoid
“extend[ing] the waiver [of sovereign immunity] beyond that
which Congress intended.”  Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 118.  Moreover,
59
the majority’s approach ignores the fact that this Court’s decision
in Barren binds us until it is set aside by an en banc panel of this
court.   See Third Cir.  I.O.P.  9.1.  
In sum, Kubrick must guide our analysis.  The reasonable
person is that individual who is armed with the facts regarding
the injuries sustained.  444 U.S. at 123.  Barren confirms as
much by observing that the Supreme Court’s concentration in
Kubrick was on the objective aspects of the test and “whether
[the plaintiff] possessed the facts such that, as a reasonable
person, he should have known of ” the injury and who caused it.
Barren, 839 F.2d at 990; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 12 (stating that “the words ‘should know’ . . . denote the fact
that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or of the
superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the facts in
question . . . or would govern his conduct upon the assumption
9.I also note that the record demonstrates that Vicki Miller
appreciated the cause of her brother’s illness in December of
1995 when she wrote to Dr. Bongiorno, a physician at a health
care facility to which her brother had been transferred.  In her
letter, she explained that, according to another physician,
“Henry’s condition was brought about by an adverse reaction to
drugs that were prescribed for him . . . .”  This evidence further
supports the conclusion that a reasonable person should have
known by late 1995 that Henry’s illness was attributable to the
government’s medical care.
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that such fact exists”) (emphasis added).  Because Vicki Miller
was repeatedly advised in October of 1995 that Henry’s medical
status was caused by a reaction to his medications, and because
these facts demonstrate that a reasonable person should have
known at that time that Henry had been injured by the
government, the District Court correctly concluded that the




I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Miller’s
state survival action against Dr. Markowitz was timely filed.  The
majority reaches this conclusion, in my view, by misreading Fine
v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850 (Pa. 2005), as authority to apply a
subjective test to determine whether the statute of limitations had
run.  By applying a subjective test, the majority takes account of
the fact that the decedent had the mental age of a four year old
and concludes that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the “decedent knew, or, more accurately, was even capable of
knowing, that he was injured and the cause of his injury.”  Maj.
op. at 34.
Fine, contrary to the majority’s analysis, did not concern
whether an objective or subjective test is to be employed in the
application of the discovery rule to a statute of limitations
dispute.  Thus, the Fine Court did not abandon the objective test
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used in determining whether the statute of limitations may be
tolled by Pennsylvania’s discovery rule.  Rather, Fine concerned
two mentally competent adults who did not discover until late in
the two year limitations period that they had been injured by the
negligence of their treating medical practitioners.  The question
before the Court was whether these plaintiffs had to file their
cause of action within the remaining time in the two-year
limitations period, or within two years of the discovery that they
had been injured.  The Court held that
it is not relevant to the discovery rule application
whether or not the prescribed period has expired;
the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of
limitations in any case where a party neither knows
nor reasonably should have known of his injury
and its cause at the time his right to institute suit
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arises.
Id. at 859 (emphasis added).  Indeed, by focusing on “where a
party . . . reasonably should have known,” the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did not change the course of Pennsylvania’s
discovery rule.   Because application of the objective test shows
that a reasonable person would have known of the decedent’s
injury and its cause more than two years before this suit was
filed, I cannot agree with the majority that Miller’s state law
survival action against Dr. Markowitz was timely filed.
III.
The majority also concludes that Miller sufficiently
pleaded wrongful death claims against Dr. Markowitz and the
United States by alleging nothing more specific than negligence.
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I can discern no wrongful death claims, even liberally construing
the pleadings.  The amended complaint, prepared and signed by
experienced counsel, clearly states on the first page that Miller
was bringing this action “pursuant to the Pennsylvania Survival
Act, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 8302.”  Thereafter, she asserts six counts
alleging that the negligence of various persons caused the
decedent to sustain various maladies and that he eventually died.
In my view, the mere reference to death in the amended
complaint, without more, is insufficient to put the defendants on
notice that Miller was asserting, in addition to her clearly
articulated survival action, a wrongful death claim under a
separate statutory provision of Pennsylvania law, i.e., 42
Pa.Cons.Stat. § 8301.  See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957) (instructing that Rule 8 requires a statement of the claim
“that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”).  
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Indeed, my review of the record fails to reveal any action
by Miller, either before or after the District Court granted the
motion for summary judgment, that indicated that Miller was in
fact prosecuting a wrongful death action.  The absence of a
wrongful death claim would not have been surprising in light of
the fact that Miller did not qualify as one of the enumerated
beneficiaries for whom the statute created a right of action.  See
42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 8301(b) (stating that the “right of action
created by this section shall exist only for the benefit of the
spouse, children or parents of the deceased”).  Although
subsection (d) allows a personal representative, such as Miller,
to bring a wrongful death action, any recovery is limited to
specific types of damage that may have been incurred as a result
of the injuries causing death.  42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 8301(d)
(specifying that the personal representative “may bring an action
to recover damages for reasonable hospital, nursing, medical,
66
funeral expenses and expenses of administration necessitated by
reason of injuries causing death”).  
Thus, the District Court understandably addressed only the
merits of Miller’s survival action.   After the District Court
entered judgment in favor of the United States and Dr.
Markowitz and closed the case, Miller still did not take any
action to notify the District Court that it had erred by dismissing
her wrongful death claim.  Instead of filing a motion for
reconsideration, which would have provided the District Court
with its first opportunity to address the viability of a wrongful
death claim, Miller filed this appeal alleging error by the District
Court.  In light of the failure to plead a wrongful death action and
the absence of any conduct which would have notified the
District Court that this separate cause of action was at issue, I
cannot subscribe to the majority’s conclusion that the District
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Court erred by conflating the two causes of actions.  Indeed, in
my view, there were not two causes of action to conflate. 
IV.
In sum, I submit that Miller’s FTCA and state law survival
actions were time-barred because the cause of action accrued
more than two years before she filed suit.  Because Miller did not
allege a  wrongful death claim under the FTCA or state law,
remand is unnecessary.  I would affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
